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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~E1:'l:il~YOK CO~f-;TRrcr·l'ION" COM-, 
J AN'i, a corporation, 
Pf a i 11 ti ff-Appell ant, 
Case No. 
-\'- ( 10897 . 
flTATE ROAD COl\DlI8~;10N OF ) 
lTrrAII, 
Def enda.nt-Respon.dent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATFRE OF CASE 
Appellant brought ~nit against respondent, State 
Road Commission of Utah, wherein appellant sought to 
recover legal expense~ inennPd hy appellant during the 
defense of a lawsuit insituted by a third party while 
appPllant wa~ performing a construdion contract exe-
<uted between appellant and respondent. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss appellant'~ 
complaint on the grounds that: (1) Appellant's com-
plaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be 
granted, and (2) the court lacked jurisdiction over re-
spondent on the grounds and for the reasons that re-
spondent was immune from appellant's suit. 
On or about the 16th day of March, 1967, respond-
ent's motion to dismiss was heard by the Honorable D. 
Frank Wilkins, of the district court of Salt Lalrn County, 
State of Utah. Respondent's motion to dismiss was 
granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the granting of respond-
ent's motion to dismiss should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with appellant's position that, for 
t)le purposes of a motion to dismiss, the f ~ts as alleged 
by appellant must be taken as true. 
A brief summary of the facts is as follows : After 
the execution of a highway construction contract, known 
and identified as Project No. I-IG-15-7(34), Second Con· 
tract, and Project No. I-15-6( 46)306, Second Contract, by 
and between appellant and respondent, and during the 
performance of the contract by appellant, a complaint 
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\l'ai:i filed in the distrid court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, by the Eimco Corporation wherein the Eimco 
Corporation sought to restrain and enjoin the completion 
of the project by alleging that the public enjoyed only 
a highway easement along Sixth South Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and that the construction 0£ an elevated 
highway would bmden the east·ment by and through the 
construction of piers, pillars, and other obstructive ap-
pendages. This burdening of the easement allegedly 
ncessitated the payment of compensation to the Eimco 
Corporation. The complaint also alleged an interferl'nce 
with light and air easements. 
At the hearing of respondent's motion to dismiss, 
it was agreed by the parties that the suit of the Eimco 
Corporation was dismissed. 
It is the legal expense incurred by appellant in the 
defense of the Eimco Corporation suit that is the subject 
of the present claim by appellant against respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
'l'HE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEL-
LANT'S COMPLAINT. 
A principle firmly established by the decisions of 
this court is that the State of Utah and the Utah State 
Road Commission, as an agency of the State of Utah, 
may not hf' sued without the express written permission 
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of the State of Utah. Wilkinson v. State of Utah, 48 
Utah 483, 134 Pac. 626 (1913); Springville Banking Co. 
v. Burton, 10 Utah 2nd 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960); Fair-
clough v. State Road Commission, 10 Utah 2nd 417, 354 
P.2d 104 (1960); State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2nd 65, 368 
P.2d 585 (1962). 
Appellant does not assail this basic principle, but 
attenipts to briµg the facts of the ·instant case within the 
statutory exception of Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-9 (1967), 
which provides: 
By its name the commission may sue, and it may 
be sued only on written contracts made by it or 
under its authority. 
It may parenthetically be noted that respondent 
takes no issue with appellant'::; generalizations concern-
ing the binding and forceful effect of contracts duly 
executed l;>y respondent or under the authority of re-
spondent, and if respondent breaches the contract, dam· 
ages which are the natural consequence of the breach 
should be allowed. 
However, the contracts executed by and between the 
parties in the instant case contain no express provision 
relating to the indemnification by the commission of 
costs of this nature incurred by the contractor in the 
performan~ of the contract. Appellant does not allege 
the existence of such an expressed provision and con-
cedes that no such express provision exists. There being 
no express provision of this nature, respondent submits 
that appellant's action 1s not predicated on a written 
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contract executed by the respondent or under respond-
ent's authority. 
A provision for indemnification of legal expenses 
incurred in the performance of a contract is not a condi-
tion precedent to the perfonuauce of a contract. An 
example of a condition precedent to the performance of 
a contract which may be implied from the contract and 
enforceable, is the Joctrin~ that ~n the absence of an 
express provision, a provisiou will be implied that a con-
struction site will oo made available to the contractor 
so that the contract may be performed. Therefore, re-
spondent submits that a provision of indemnification is 
not the type of condition which may be implied against 
respondent and for which respondent may be held liable. 
Deruy Road Building Co. v. Commonwealth Dep't. of 
Highways, 317 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1958); George A. Moore 
& Associates, Inc. v. State Bd. of Conrol, 240 Ore. 126, 
-100 P.2d 263 (1965). 
Recognizing the absence of an express provision of 
indemnification in the subject contract and also the im-
possibility of implying such a provision, appellant at-
tempts to bring the fa~ts of the instant case within the 
writhm contract. The State of Utah Standard Specifica-
tions for Road and Bridge Construction,§ 1-7.18 (1960), 
which are incorporated into and constitute a part of the 
eon tract between the parties, provides at 48: 
The director will he responsible for the securing 
of all necessary rights-of-way in advance of con-
struction. 
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It is this contractual provision which appellant now ' 
alleges was breached by respondent. However, respondent 
submits that such an allegation fails to state a claim on 
which relief may be granted as a matter of law. 
It is elementary that before a breach of contract 
may properly be said to have occurred, one of the parties 
to the contract must have committed either an overt act 
contrary to the terms of the contract or omitted to act 
as required by the contract. In the instant case, no such 
act or failure to act is alleged. Rather, the breach of con-
tract which appellant seeks to attribute to respondent is 
the institution of a suit by an independent third party 
over whom respondent exercised no control or authority. 
Respondent submits that the mere allegations of a 
stranger to the contract may not be interpreted as a 
breach of the contract by one of the parties thereto. 
The right of way furnished to appellant by respond-
ent was sufficient and in compliance to the terms of the 
written contract. This is exemplified by the fact that, 
had not the third party action been instituted, there 
would have been no claim of insufficiency of the right 
of way. Also, both appellant and respondent agree that 
the third party suit by Eimco Corporation was dismissed 
and no judgment adverse to appellant or respondent 
rendered. 
It is equally forecful to say that appellant could 
have reasonably foreseen the possibiliy of a third party 
suit of this nature as to impose such a duty on respond-
ent. There was no guarantee or contractual warranty by 
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respondent that an unmeritorious third-party suit of the 
nature instituted by the Eirnco Corporation would not 
be brought during the course of construction. 
ltcspondcnt, therefore, sub111its that the right of 
way furnished to appellant was sufficient and in compli-
ance with the terms of the contract as a matter of law. 
It may be noted that in each case cited by appellant, 
the breach of contract found to exist was an actual fact 
' 
on the part of the defendant. For example, in Madison 
County Constr. Co. v. State, 177 Misc. 777, 31 N.Y.S.2d 
883 (1941), the court sated at 31 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886: 
In the action [instituted h.v the third party], it 
was held that the location of the road, as fixed 
by the state authorities and upon which location 
claimant was working, included lands which were 
not owned by the state but by private parties. 
In effect it [result of the third party suit] meant 
that the state, in staking out the highway, had 
led the claimant to believe that it was working on 
land acquired by the state, which was not the fact. 
In the instant case, the suit instituted by the Eimco 
Corporation was dismissed with nu findings adverse to 
the appellant. There was also no finding that the right of 
way furnished by respondent was insufficient. Respond-
ent again reiterates its position that the bare allegations 
of a third party are not sufficit>nt to constitute a breach 
of contract on the part of respondent. Had the Eimco 
Corporation suit dctenninc·d that the right of way trans-
gressed a property right or interst of Eimco Corporation, 
respondent would concede to the allegations of appellant. 
However, such was not the case. 
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In support of the contention that the damages allcg~d 1 
by appellant may be recoverd from respondent, appellant 
cites Cooper v. W eissblatt, 15-1 Misc. 522, 277 N.Y.~. 
709 ( 1935). In that case, however, the court reco1:,111izcd 
the necessity of two elements that must exist before a 
plaintiff may recover from a defendant costs incurr~d 
by the plaintiff in a prior suit that resulted from th~ 
actions of the defendant. These prerequisites were: (1) 
a breach of contract by the defendant, and (2) a judg-
ment in the prior suit against the plaintiff. It is obvious 
that in the instant case, neither required element is pres-
ent. Respondent submits that there was not a breach 
of the terms of the written contract by the rcspondenl 
a::; a matter of law, and also, as a matter of fact, no 
judgment was obtained against the appellant by the 
Eimco Corporation in the prior suit. 
The theory of Cooper v. W eissblatt, supra, presents 
an additional problem in that the doctrine of soverign 
immunity is waived only in suits predicated on written 
contracts executed by respondent or under the authority 
of respondent. It is extremely questionable whether the 
doctrine announced i11 Cooper v. Weissblatt, supra, even 
if the two require elements were present in the instant 
case, would be controlling. 
It must also be noted that appellant's citation to 
25 C.J.S. Damages ~ 50 ( e), at 787 ( 19GG), applies only 
where there is an overt "unlawful act" on the part of 
the defendant. Also, in Wunderlich v. St.ate Highway 
Oomm'n., 183 Miss. 428, 18-1 So. 456 (1938), the court 
considered a factual situation whereby the defendant did 
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not furnish the necessary right of wuy to the contractor 
until 105 days of the 200 day working time had expired. 
lt is 0Lv10usly significant that the authorities cited 
by appellant deal with speeifie ad::; or omissions on the 
part of the governmental agency, and not, as the fact::; 
in the instant case establish, situations when"hy tl11c· qm·s-
tion as to the sufficiency of tht• rii:;lit of way arises by 
virtue of a suit initiated by an independent third party 
who is a stranger to the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The granting of respondent's motion to dismiss by 
the lower court was in accordance with Pstahlishcd l<>gal 
principles and good common sense. The doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity would preclude appellant's suit as not 
being predicated on a written contract executd by the 
respondent or under respondent's authority. The alle-
gation that respondent breached the contract in failing to 
supply appellant with good and sufficic•nt right of \rny 
assumes the illogical foundation that the acts of an 
independent third party and stranger to th contract may 
be imputed and considered a breach of the contract by 
one of the actual contracting parties. Such a foundation 
is obviously without legal support. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
9 
